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Gone for Good? 
Determinants of School Dropout in Southern Italy
*
 
The aim of the present paper is to gain some insight into the causes of dropping out of school 
and, more generally, of the factors that induce parents to review their choices about their 
child’s schooling careers. To this end we apply to data from a school dropout survey insights 
from a model of sequential decision making by parents, where the initial decision can be 
reviewed in the light of new information emerging about the ability and opportunities of the 
child in benefitting from education relative to her outside (in the unskilled market). Analysis of 
the data confirms the role of both economic capacity (opportunity costs) and cultural capacity 
(ability to disentangle signals about future opportunities) of the family of origin shape 
observed choices about drop-out and return to school by individuals in our sample. Dropping 
out behaviour also appears to be strongly influenced by mismatches between school and 
student, however, and many of those who leave are not “gone for good”. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  I21, J13, J24 
  





Floro Ernesto Caroleo 
Department of Economics 
University of Naples “Parthenope” 
Via Medina 40 
80133 Naples 
Italy 
E-mail: caroleo@uniparthenope.it     
 
                
 
                                                 
* We acknowledge financial support from the Province of Salerno in undertaking the survey on which 
this paper is based. Thanks are also due to participants in the workshop on Education Supply and 
Demand in Italy, Turin, 18 May 2007 and at the AIEL conference in Naples, 13-14 September 2007 
and in particular to Daniele Checchi and Giuseppe Bertola, who also organised the Turin meeting, 
along with an anonymous referee for their insightful comments on previous versions and which we 
very much hope lead to the paper’s substantial improvement. Unfortunately none of these can be 
blamed for any remaining errors of omission or commission which remain firmly with the authors.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, data from the “school dropout survey” undertaken in Salerno Province by the Centre for 
Labour Economics and Economic Policy (CELPE) are analysed. A key feature of our sample is that a 
substantial proportion of school “dropouts” subsequently return to some form of education. 
Abandoning school for a period and then possibly returning to education in a different school is 
obviously an indication of distress and suggests that education choices are subject to several kind of 
errors and mistakes: mistakes parents make about the kids ability to pursue a specific education career, 
changes in the child’s attitudes towards school in a period of their life (adolescence) when her 
character, social skills and specific capacity to adapt to learning and education evolve and are subject to 
shocks somewhat not perfectly controlled or forecasted by families. These social and psychological 
aspects make the study of these problems from the economic point of view quite entangled. From a 
purely choice theoretic perspective, parental aspirations and their choices about their child’s 
educational career involve subtle psychological and sociological aspects not easily squared with a 
simple investment approach to education choice. Such choices may be reviewed in the light of the new 
information about opportunities and abilities that unravels when the child grows as an adolescent. This 
new information may arise from parental experience about the cultural evolution of the young man as a 
student, about the quality of the match between a specific child and a specific school or teacher, or 
simply about the opportunity cost of education given what parents see as the return to have their child 
educated. However, even if it is a hard task to square decisions made by adolescents and their parent 
during this period of the child’s life with a choice theoretical framework, studying the economic 
implications of these decisions is important from an economic perspective. Choices made during 
childhood have important effects later in life, shaping the destiny of the young person both in terms of 
social status and of economic returns of investments in human capital made during adolescence. More 
generally, the presence of mistakes and errors may be an indication of an inefficient allocation of 
talents to school tracks during adolescence and therefore, given the large involvement of public 
resources in the education systems, the study of these problems is very important also from the 
perspective of policy design as well. 
  2The aim of our work is to gain some understanding of the causes of dropping out of school and, more 
generally, of the reasons that induce parents to review their choices about their child’s schooling 
careers. The paper proposes a model of sequential decision making by parents where the decision can 
be reviewed in the light of new information emerging about the ability and opportunities of the child in 
profiting from education relative to her outside (in the unskilled market). The model allows 
interpretation of such dropout and return behaviour and emphasises the separate role of both economic 
and cultural capacity (as regards the ability to disentangle signals about future opportunities) for 
equilibrium decision making. On the other hand, being a partial equilibrium model, we do not tackle 
efficiency issues that obviously arise, and use the model as a guide for the implementation of the 
analysis of the data and as a theoretical framework to interpret empirical results.  Specifically, the 
nature of the theoretical model leads fairly naturally to the implementation of a censored bivariate 
probit model of initial dropout and return to school by young people.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present some stylized facts and some 
related literature, in section 3 we present the model, in section 4 we present the empirical results; 
section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Some Stylised facts and a glance at the literature  
 
The Lisbon agenda includes several quantitative targets for education and training systems in Europe. 
One specific goal is reducing the share of early school leavers – i.e. 18-24 years-old with at most a 
lower secondary education qualification and not in further education – to less than 10% by 2010. 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002). The reason is that rising skills demands imply the 
necessity of the completion of at least upper secondary education for successful labour market entry 
and for further participation in lifelong learning (see OECD, 2000). Even though present trends show, 
in general, clearly decreasing levels of early school-leavers in the Member States - especially in Spain, 
Italy, Greece, France, Belgium and Finland - (Quintini and Martin, 2006), further efforts are required to 
enable the EU to reach the target, as the loss of stock of human capital is still unacceptably high. 
A recent analysis carried out by the Ministry of Public Education (Ministero della Pubblica 
Istruzione, 2006, pp. 12-13, tab.7) points out some peculiarities of the drop out phenomenon in Italy, 
underlining that: 
  3-  both failure at school and dropout are so widespread that about a third young men and  
more than one-in-five young women enrolled in upper secondary school do not obtain the 
“diploma”; 
-  female educational performance is better than males, particularly in technical and 
vocational schools; 
-  students attending classical and scientific schools have the highest probability of 
completing their studies in all the geographical areas of Italy while those attending technical 
schools in the North of Italy have a lower probability of completing their studies than in other 
areas. This may plausibly be explained by the, at times opposing, motivations for dropping out 
related to  the opportunity cost of, and expected (employment and income) returns to education. 
Thus, dropping  out is a characteristic of both depressed and developed areas. The early entry 
into the labour market in Lombardia and other areas in the North-East where the labour demand 
is high can cause a crowding effect of the schooling and training system, raising the risk of 
lower  qualified occupations in the future (table 1).  
 
Table 1: Probability of obtaining final diploma by gender, geographical area and 
type of school (graduates from the school  per 100 enrolled at the first year 5 years 
before) – Upper secondary school public and private - year 2004-05 





Technical Vocational Arts 
TOTAL   72,3   85,6   82,3   79,0   47,8   62,9  
North   71,1   85,3   84,7   73,4   51,3   68,5  
Centre   74,4   86,7   78,5   82,3   48,4   61,2  
South and 
Islands  
72,4   85,4   82,1   82,6   44,8   59,5  
MALES    67,1   84,7   87,5   74,5   41,5   56,7  
North   64,7   83,5   90,7   67,9   43,8   59,5  
Centre   69,7   88,7   69,9   75,9   42,2   55,8  
South and 
Islands  
67,9   83,8   91,5   79,6   39,7   55,2  
FEMALES  78,1   86,3   81,5   87,6   56,5   66,0  
North   78,1   86,8   83,8   83,2   60,3   72,6  
Centre   79,5   85,3   80,1   95,5   56,5   63,8  
South and 
Islands  
77,5   86,5   80,6   88,6   52,9   61,8  
Source: Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione (2006b, table 7, p. 13) 
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Concerning the case under study, table 2 reports residents at the beginning of the years 2003-2005 by 
age in the Province of Salerno and students enrolled in the schooling year 2004-05. Each age group 
comprises 13-14.000 individuals. The gap between the numbers of those enrolled and age-specific age 
population is around 10% of the population which in itself provides a very rough indicator of the extent 
of dropping out before completion of secondary school. Moreover, both the numbers enrolled and the 
proportion in State schools decline from 15 to 18 years. The first phenomenon is an aspect of what is 
known  “school dispersion” and the second signals that students shifts from public to private schools in 
order to become secondary school graduates. 
 































15 13390  6825  13954  7056  13474 6971 12885 12616 97.9 
16 13723  7002  13447  6845  14030 7101 13025 12645 97.1 
17 13937  7177  13769  7009  13482 6879 12211 11749 96.2 
18 14329  7317  13980  7209  13801 7031 10370 9844  94.3 
Total 55379  28321  55150  28119  54787  27982  48491 46854 96.6 
Source: Istat (2003-2005) and Ministry of  Public Education (2006a)  
 
Data taken from the 2001 Census of Population and reported in Table 3 confirm that the number of 
residents aged 15-18 in the Province of Salerno not enrolled to a regular course of study increases as 
the age increases.   
In the last decade the Italian authorities, aiming at reducing drop out rates, have opted to change the 
minimum school-leaving age introducing compulsory schooling and training up to age 18 (Law 
n.144/1999 “obbligo formativo” and Law n.53/2003 “diritto dovere all’istruzione e alla formazione”). 
The institutional actors, public or private, involved in the realization of such obligation are manifold 
(Schools, Training Centres, Employment Agencies) and at different level of governance: central 
(Ministry of Education) and local (Regions, Provinces, Local Employment Agencies). The duty of all 
of them is to follow the students in pursuing their studies and to make easier the school-to-work 
transitions, developing broad-based community partnerships aimed at helping at-risk youth. 
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Age  Residents      
(A) 
Enrolled in a 
regular course of 
study (B) 
Not enrolled 





15 13867  11914  1953  14 
16 13881  11131  2750  19.81 





   
 9528  4855 33.75 
Totale 56613  43431  13182 23.28 




      Source : ISTAT(2001) 
 
Students who drop out face a lot of economic and social difficulties. Several studies find that adult 
earnings are higher when students are compelled to take an extra year of school (Oreopoulos 2007; 
Angrist  and Krueger 1991; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Blundell, Sianesi and Dearden, 2003). The 
positive social externalities are also considerable. Drop outs are more likely to be unemployed, 
reporting poor health, being depressed, being in a low skilled manual occupation, drawing on social 
assistance and other welfare programs, and to end up in jail (Lochner and Moretti 2004). 
Many factors have been identified as influencing dropping out. Some are school-related: a drop out 
does not like school in general or the school he/she is attending, he is failing, getting poor grades, or 
cannot keep up with school work, he does not get along with teachers and/or students. Other factors are 
student-related: a drop out has disciplinary problems, is suspended, or expelled, he does not feel safe in 
school, he has different traits than those who graduate (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999) for example: low 
ability and/or motivation, low expected returns to graduation, better market opportunities for the jobs 
that don’t require graduation, lower consumption value of school attendance. Reasons for dropping out 
may be related to personal problems as well: drug and alcohol abuse, obesity or health problems (Celpe 
2006). Other factors are family-related: stressful/unstable home life, lack of family support, 
socioeconomic status, single-parent households, poor education of parents, desires to get  married 
and/or getting pregnant (Cardoso and Verner, 2006). There are also some categories of youth that are at 
more at risk of dropping out: certain ethnic groups, students living in large cities or in a poor areas, or 
attending schools whose structure or academic and social organization may not favour the holding in of 
students at risk (Lee and Burkam 2003).  
  6The standard human capital model assumes that students are rational and time consistent, so the 
choice of the optimal education attainment level may be treated as an investment decision (Becker 
1964; Card 1999). That level is defined by the point where the opportunity costs from additional 
schooling outweigh the benefits. Students who decide to drop out because of psychological or 
motivational problems, are simply evaluating that forgone earnings and effort costs from attending 
school are higher than the estimated expected benefits. 
However, it is widely recognized that the standard model cannot completely explain drop out 
behaviour. Policymakers want to update compulsory school laws and to introduce restrictions on the 
choice of students because they are persuaded that leaving secondary school before graduation is a sub-
optimal outcome. Oreopoulos (2007) finds “significant lifetime rewards to wealth, health, and overall 
happiness from having to take another year of school” as well as substantial income gains so that 
disutility from not attending school is very high. 
There are other reasons that may account to some extent for the decision to leave the school. Credit 
constraints may mean that students, especially those from low income families, cannot borrow against 
the expected higher outcomes to finance the ex ante optimal level education (Carneiro and Heckman 
2002). Myopic behaviour of drop outs may also lead to a similar outcome. Students may give greater 
emphasis on the present, because they make erroneous predictions of future returns or underestimate 
the real gains from school or have negative expectations about the future, so they attach more weight to 
the current non pecuniary or monetary costs in calculating the school attainment decisions. Sociological 
and psychological research points to the importance of a student’s social group in determining their 
active involvement in school. This literature (for a review see Akerlof and Kranton 2002) considers 
schools as institutions, with social goals besides imparting skill, and highlights that educational 
outcomes of students depend on their identification with the school's social category and its ideal  
student. A further aspect that has been investigated is the role that schools –their structures, their 
academic organisation and their social organisation- play in students’ decisions to stay in school or 
leave before graduating (Lee and Burkam 2003). Factors related to school quality are also important in 
determining whether students who leave their high schools either transfer to another school (and thus 
stay in school) or leave school altogether (Rumberger and Thomas 2000; Hanushek, Lavy and Hitomi 
2006).  
Different dropping out explanations, obviously, call for different policy designs. Compulsory school 
legislation may be effective when staying in school has significant benefits in term of future rewards to 
wealth and well being. On the contrary, policies aimed at forcing students to remain in school until they 
  7graduate may have little impact if the reasons for leaving school are related to the individual 
characteristics: the lack of motivation, low ability, or the greater preference for low skilled jobs. In this 
case, it becomes necessary to alter the traits with which youths come to high school. Policy options, 
aimed at reducing the costs of schooling (both direct and indirect) or offsetting immediate costs with 
immediate benefits, may improve the student’s skill upgrading when drop outs do not correctly 
evaluate the future returns to schooling because of a myopic behaviour or because of the family 
background, credit constraints, extremely poor economic and social environment. As noted above, 
psychologists and ethnographers often point at the importance of a student’s attitude towards school, 
rooted in their social and cultural background, in influencing their school choice decision, so it 
becomes important that schools reinforce the social inclusion and the social identity of their students. 
Finally, sociological theory stresses also the relevance of organizational and structural characteristics of 
school -i.e. size and sector, curricula offered, the character of relationship between students and 
teachers, etc.- in the decision of students, implying that policymakers have to pay a special attention to 
strengthen the quality of schools.  
 
 
  83. A framework for the analysis. A simple model of parental sequential choices about their 
children’s schooling careers.  
 
In this section we build up a framework for the analysis of the main determinants of the decision to 
quit school, and possibly return to it, after having spent a period out. The model is based on a simple 
idea of repeated learning by parents about their children’s abilities and (future) job market 
opportunities
2. Sending the child to school allows parents to assess their ability in the labour market 
and formulate expectations about the child’s wage on the skilled labour market relative to the unskilled 
one. The main building blocks of the model are as follows: parents use school signals to extract 
information about their child’s ability as a skilled worker based on their prior beliefs and on the 
evidence provided by school assessment. If the signal at school is bad, parents re-assess the value of 
investment in human capital depending on their private signal on the child’s ability. After balancing the 
private with the public signal (the relative precision of these being crucial for the assessment) parents 
make a decision about school enrolment in subsequent grades. If the child leaves school, she spends a 
period out of education and further information accrues to her parents about her specific ability in the 
unskilled job market. Conditional on this information, parents may decide to leave the child outside 
school or to give her a second chance to proceed in education. This latter hypothesis, i.e. that some 
information about future alternative opportunities to the child is collected when he spends a period out 
of school, is the key element to understanding the process of re-entry. 
Parental capacity to assess their child’s quality and use the public signal at school, along with the 
opportunity cost of education and some form of irreversibility of education choices will determine the 
equilibrium choices in this model: parental culture (precision of the private signal of the child’s ability), 
school quality (the precision of the public signal provided in grading the child’s performance at 
school), and economic status (the opportunity costs of educational investment) matter in our 
framework. As for irreversibility we will assume that high school can only be completed when the 
child is adolescent and stays with her parents. We will also assume that after completing high school 
the decision about the young person’s future career (university versus unskilled labour market) is 
irreversible.   
                                                 
2 The identification of the parent(s) as the decision-maker rather than the individual directly concerned aligns this paper 
with the convention usually adopted in overlapping generations models, rather than the standard human capital model which 
tends to identify the (potential) student as the decision-maker. Indeed this may look strange to readers more familiar with 
the latter type of model. However, the crucial simplifying assumption here is that there is a single decision-maker rather 
than who that decision-maker is. For a model with altruistic parents choosing their children’s human capital investment see, 
for example, Mookherjee & Ray (2003).
 
  9Specifically, we consider two basic paths leading the child to being prepared, as an adult, either for 
the skilled labour force (say university enrolment) or for the unskilled labour force. We assume that 
decisions are made by altruistic parents. These choices are based on the parental assessment of the 
benefits of the child’s schooling alternatives, given their expectation about wages in the skilled and 
unskilled labour market. These assessments regard the child’s ability in the two labour markets. School 
is assumed not to add skills valuable on the job market, this is a strong simplification but a richer role 
for school could easily be considered within the model
3.  
Choices are made sequentially, conditional on the signals parents get about their children’s ability 
and their market opportunities. In making their sequential choices, parents trade-off these benefits with 
their opportunity costs of having their children educated. Sequentiality of choices reviewed in the light 
of the new information is modelled as follows. We divide the child’s time horizon (call it adolescence) 
for the family decisions into three periods. The existence of compulsory basic education means that 
parents have to send children to school for at least one period at the end of which a signal is collected 
about the child’s ability. At the beginning of period two, parents make a choice about the child’s future 
career: either they withdraw him from school or they have him complete his education. This choice is 
made conditional on the signal being collected at school in the first period (educational score at school 
in period one) balancing it with their priors about the child’s ability. If parents choose to leave the child 
at school he completes his schooling career in period two and has to decide whether to enrol at a higher 
level (university, say) or get back to the unskilled labour market.  
Conditional on the parental decision to withdraw the child from school at the beginning of the second 
period, we assume the child spends a period out learning his alternative opportunities on the unskilled 
labour market
4. Again, after having spent a period out of school and having obtained a signal about her 
                                                 
3 For a richer view of child’s identity and education see Akerlof and Kranton (2002). Assuming education is productive 
would increase the incentive to stay in school and, where relevant, to return after dropping out but would not change the 
implications of the model.  
4 The description of a period out of school during adolescence has to be interpreted in quite broad terms. It may vary 
depending on the actual socio-economic contexts in which the family investment in educating their children is cast. For 
example in less developed countries or areas, where agriculture or small scale family business play important role, failing at 
school will likely involve for the kid a period of actual training in the traditional occupation. In more developed countries or 
regions kids’ failing at school may only involve further information acquisition by parents about alternative opportunities 
(this information acquisition by parents may range from a more careful investment in the parent-child relationship 
entrusting a psychologist or a private tutor, discussing the issue with friends and relatives to better assess the child’s talents 
for alternative occupations. We do not enter into such details- which can be quite important- since our working hypothesis is 
meant to deal with several specific socioeconomic environments: after the kid is perceived to have failed at school parents 
have incentives to review their prior about the kids talents in different occupations and condition their education investment 
upon this new information. 
  10child’s opportunities on the (unskilled) labour market they make their decision again: they can leave 
the child in the unskilled labour market or have her return to school.  
At equilibrium, in each family, choices about a child’s career will depend on the skill premium 
expected given the signals (i.e. the relative expected benefits from the two alternative paths), the 
opportunity cost of education, and on the precision of the signal about the child’s potential ability as a 
skilled worker (at school) and her opportunities on the unskilled job market.   
To analyze the model we make a bunch of simplifying assumptions none of which will affect our 
main results whose economics will turn out to be quite intuitive. We assume that there is one parent 
and one child, the decision is made by the parent, leaving the child with no meaningful decision. Our 
model is a partial equilibrium model, i.e. we do not derive the equilibrium level of the skill premium as 
a function of family choices. Learning occurs optimally given the information accruing to parents as 
time unravels. We will assume risk neutrality in parental utility and that all the signals used for parental 
decisions and the parameters on which the decision making is made contingent on are normally   
distributed
5.  We also assume no discounting by parents and, just for simplicity, no tuition fees for high 
school enrolment with anticipated costs of university enrolment being equal to Ts
6. 
As already discussed, once children complete high school, the choice between going to university and 
working in the unskilled labour market becomes irreversible. Analogously, after two periods in the 
unskilled labour market children are not allowed to return to school. This is equivalent to making the 
cost of switching back to education after a certain age sufficiently large. A less drastic assumption 
would have been to provide parents and children with the option to switch across educational careers 
for a longer horizon at a smoothly increasing costs. This assumption is only made to avoid recursive 
formulation of the more general dynamic programming problem that would arise in the absence of 
complete irreversibility. This richer formulation would not change the main results, however. Finally 
we assume that the children’s abilities are relevant on the skilled labour market but are not on the 
unskilled labour market
7. This will simplify the derivation of the formula for the information updating 
process by the parent quite a bit, but again, most of the results would go unchanged with a more 
general role of ability in both markets. More specific comments about these assumptions will be 
provided in the following.  
                                                 
5 Both these assumptions can be dispensed with the results going almost unchanged if we assume risk aversion on the 
child’s benefits and risk neutrality with respect the parents’ income and i.i.d properties of the shocks accruing to parents’ 
information set. 
6 Which may include perceived consumption costs as well as tuition fees and the like. 
7 Equivalently the assumption is that child’s ability index valuable in the skilled labour market is independent of the ability 
index that defines the child’s market opportunities in the unskilled labour market. 
  11The details of the decision making process and the time line faced by parents are as follows.  
At time t=0 parents enrol their child at school. The child’s ability is denoted α , which is equal to the 
child’s value (productivity) expected on the skilled labour market (denoted s w α ), and is related to 
parental beliefs by the relation: 
 
(1)     ε θ α + = , 
 
where θ  is the parent’s initial assessment, ε  is the noise affecting parental judgement. We assume 
the signal θ  is unbiased
8 i.e.,ε  follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance  . This latter 
can be family specific and reflect cultural heterogeneity among families in their capacity to assess 
child’s ability valuable for the skilled sector. Having assumed it is unbiased, the prior assessment about 
the child’s value on the skilled labour market is 
2
ε σ
θ . A Parent’s unconditional expectation about his 
child’s abilities is therefore:  
 
(2)   θ α = ] [ E  
 
Sending the child to school provides a signal on his ability level  
 
(3)   t t s z + =α  
 
Where   follows a normal distribution with mean 0 t s
9 and variance  . The precision   can be 
interpreted as a quality index for the assessment process at school. 
2
s σ
2 / 1 s σ
At time t=1 the school assessment of the child’s ability is revealed as  1 1 s z + =α . The parent 
observes it and makes his first decision about the child’s career: either she is withdrawn  from school or 
                                                 
8 An unbiased signal is not necessarily a very realistic assumption (“even a beetle is a beautiful to his mother” as the 
Neapolitan saying goes) however it removes issues to do with inefficient schooling decisions and the dynastic segregation 
of jobs based upon social confidence by the upper classes. As we will see, the model already allows for the role of cultural 
bias in education decisions even with an unbiased signal: if the parent is a skilled worker, he is likely to have a low   and 
therefore attribute relatively more weight to his own assessment than to school grading than a (less educated) parent with 






9 Again, we do not consider another important source of segregation into occupations, i.e. the impact of cultural 
homogeneity among skilled families and school teachers on education choices. 
  12is allowed to continue in education. The perceived benefits from continuing in education are measured 
by the conditional expectation of the child’s ability :  
 
(4)   s t w 1 ˆ + α  where  ] [ ˆ 1 t t I E α α = +  
 
This is a measure of the expected wage in the skilled labour market as a function of the estimated 
ability of the child conditional on the parent’s information set. Specifically   is the parent’s 
information set at time t including all the signals received until then. In the first period, 
t I
{ } 1 1 ,z I θ = .  
The benefits of withdrawing the child from the school are given by the expected wage on the labour 
market plus the option value of returning to school next period.  
 
At time t=2 further information is released to parents. If the child was thusfar in school, a second 
signal about her ability in the skilled sector  2 2 s z + =α  is revealed and a decision about her future is 
made: either she continues her path towards the skilled labour market (by entering university) or she 
returns to the unskilled labour market. Benefits from continuation are therefore measured by  
(5)   ] [ ˆ
2 3 I E α α =  
The information set after two periods in school is  { } 2 1 2 , , z z I θ = . 
If the child is withdrawn from school after the first period, she spends a period out of school (say 
working), a signal is collected about the child’s opportunities in the unskilled labour market. Define  
 
(6)     t
u
t u w w + =
0
 
the child’s expected wage in the unskilled labour market. Where   is the parent’s prior belief on the 
child’s potential wage in that market and   is the specific talent of the child in this job (unobserved by 
the parent). u follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance  . The parent does not observe 
, but an unbiased signal of child’s opportunities in the unskilled labour market (say the child’s 








(7)     t
u
t w δ φ + =
 
  13where  t δ  follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance  . The information set after one 
period in school and one period out of school is then 
2
δ σ
{ } 2 1 2 , , φ θ z I
D = . 
Summarizing, we model the period of adolescence as a learning process by parents about their 
childrens’ abilities and opportunities in the presence of some degree of irreversibility of educational 
choices. Parents make sequential decisions about their child’s educational career based on their 
attainment and grades  . We will show that a good signal at school ( ) on the child’s ability  t z 1 z α  
increases parental expectations about what the child’s utility will be as a skilled worker and will 
increase  the chances that the parent will keep financing the “child’s” education. If this signal is 
relatively bad the parent will try the unskilled labour market where a signal about the child’s 
opportunities will be collected ( t φ ). If this latter signal also  turns out to be bad, the parent may be 
willing to reconsider his choice and enrol the child again at school.  
All of this is quite intuitive, the advantage of making the model explicit is to derive precise 
predictions about educational choices as a function of the parameters of the problem, i.e. the priors, the 
average skill premium in the market, the opportunity costs of children’s education for the families and 
the precision of different signals about abilities and market opportunities. Notice that, as simple as the 
model is, it can allow for economic and cultural heterogeneity at the family level. Economic 
heterogeneity is captured by the opportunity cost faced by parents who bear the full direct cost of 
education, Ts. Cultural heterogeneity is caught by the precision of the signal the parent has on their 
child’s ability in the skilled sector   and in the unskilled sector  . The time line, the evolution of 
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Figure 1: Parental choice 
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3.1 Updating information about the child’s abilities and opportunities 
 
The updating formulas are iterations on the conditional expectation operator where conditioning 
occurs on the signal recovered (this is a version of the Kalman Filter, see Sargent 1987, pp.230-231). 
Define the optimal weight parents attribute to signals from school as  
 












Where  , therefore the updating formula on the child’s ability during his school career 
under the assumption of the present model is given by 
2 ) ˆ ( t t E α α − = Σ
 
(9)   t t t t t z K K + − = −1 ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ α α  
 
Notice that K is a measure for the relative precision of the signal at school relative to the precision of 
the signal that parents collect on their own.  
Define the weight parents give to the signal about their child’s opportunity in the unskilled labour 
market as  
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Notice that H is a measure for the relative precision of the signal in the unskilled labour market 
relative to the precision of the signal that parents have on their child’s opportunities on the unskilled 
labour market. Notice that, since the child can only re-enter after one period out of school, we do not 
need iterative formulas for updating signals on the unskilled labour market opportunities. Therefore the 
formula for the expected wage in the unskilled labour market is given by  
 
(11)   1 0 1 ) 1 ( ] [ ˆ φ φ H w H w E w + − = = . 
  15 
We are able now to compute expected benefits in both sectors conditional on the relevant information 
set. 
Consider the expected productivity in the skilled sector after one year at school when the score  is 





1 1 0 1 1
) 1 (      








Where,  θ α = 0 ˆ ,   and 
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After two years of schooling, expected productivity in the skilled sector will be given by  
(13)   2 2 1 2 2 ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ z K K + − = α α  
















After one (compulsory) period at school the expected wage in the unskilled sector will be given the 
unconditional expectation  . After one period at school and one period out of school, expected 
productivity in the unskilled wage is given by 
0 w
 
(14)   1 0 1 ) 1 ( ] [ ˆ φ φ H w H w E w + − = =  
 
Having defined the information updating process for the decision maker we can solve now for the 
equilibrium choices. 
 
3.2 Equilibrium decision making about children’s careers 
 
This is a sequential parental choice model about educational careers of children. Choice at each point 
in time is made optimally, in the light of the current information set and given choices made in the past. 
An equilibrium of the decision making problem will be a set of thresholds for the scores obtained at 
school and for the signals obtained conditional on dropping out defining, in period 1, the choice to 
withdraw the child from school and, in period 2, to enrol or not in the university conditional on being at 
  16school and to re-enter or not education provided one period was spent out of school. To obtain 
equilibrium decisions we work backwards from the final period. 
After two periods at school the child, by now a young woman, has produced two signals   and   
about her productivity in the skilled labour market and no signals on the unskilled labour market. 
Therefore
1 z 2 z
10 a university career will be chosen if  
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This characterizes family decisions in the third period as a function of the history of scores at school, 
their relative precision and other parameters of the model. 
After the first period of schooling, i.e. conditioning on   alone, with no discounting, the net benefits 
from continuation at school have to be traded off against benefits from switching to the alternative of 
dropping out. In the Appendix, using the iterated expectation law, we show that the choice of dropping 
out reduces to the following inequality 
1 z
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10 Remember that after completing high school we assume that the choice between university and unskilled labour market 
becomes irreversible. This hypothesis is made mainly to simplify the model and is equivalent to make the cost of switching 
back to education after a certain age sufficiently large. However, the idea that irreversibility of choices about occupational 
careers is a realistic feature of the model. A less drastic assumption would give a longer horizon to agents maintaining the 
option to go back and forth different education choices for a larger number of periods at increasing costs, until it is no more 
worthwhile to gather information about different alternatives.  
  17 
Therefore a parent will choose to have the child to continue in school for the second period if the 
signal in the first period is good enough  
(20)  
) 1 (






















and drop out otherwise. This characterize family decisions as a function of first period signal at school. 
Finally we need to characterize the decision about re-entering school after one period out. To this end 
we define the expected benefits for continuing in the unskilled labour market conditional on two 
signals:  2 φ  (  is assumed to be irrelevant to review priors about child’s ability in the unskilled labour 
markets) and the expected benefits from re-entry conditioning on   alone (since 
1 z
1 z 2 φ  is assumed to be 
irrelevant to assess opportunities in the skilled labour market). The latter is equal to the left hand side 
of equation (18). The former is given by: 
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Therefore re-entry will occur if and only if 
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At equilibrium, conditional on having dropped out of school, the probability of re-entry is negatively 
related to the signal parents obtain about the child’s opportunities in the unskilled labour market. The 
intuition for the result is quite straightforward: the child is given a second chance at school if the signal 
about alternative opportunities is even worse than the signal obtained at school. What is of interest for 





  183.3 Comparative statics and predictions for the empirical results 
 
The main conclusion we draw from the theoretical framework described in the present section is that 
during school families learn about their child’s talent in alternative occupations and react to this 
information through the choice of educational investment. We identify a set of parameters that 
characterize the family’s socio-economic status as an important determinant of drop-out behaviour. The 
model also shows that there is the possibility that a parent may rationally decide to have his child return 
to school after spending a period outside as a reaction to new information about his kid’s talent.  The 
next section will investigate whether this is empirically relevant and whether the determinants of 
dropping out and re-entry reflect the determinants highlighted in the model we presented. Importantly 
for the discussion of our empirical results we consider the comparative statics for the equilibrium 
threshold for dropping out of school and the equilibrium threshold for re-entry. Results can be stated 
about the effects of the relative precision of the signals in the parent’s information sets, providing some 
characterization of the effect of cultural heterogeneity on educational choices. 
Dropping out after the first period signal was characterized by the threshold  (.) ~
1 z  defined in eq. (20). 
By using the definition for   and  , this latter expression can be rewritten as:  1 K 2 K
 























We immediately obtain the following comparative statics results: 
  

































A larger perceived skill premium (larger   or lower  ) intuitively makes families’ choices less 
selective, reducing the threshold and allowing their kids to continue even in the face of a bad school 
signal
s w 0 w
11. Larger educational costs   make families more selective and increase the probability of  s T
                                                 
11 Though intuitive, this results is interesting: raising trends (as recently observed in Oecd countries) in the skill premiums 
induce families to be more pushy in the career choice of their kids diluting talent allocation in the skilled sector, see 
D’Amato and Mookherjee, (2007). 
  19school abandonment. A larger θ  i.e. a better prior about the child’s talents in the skilled sector makes 
families less selective and reduces the probability of dropping out.  
 
Those results are quite intuitive and will be used extensively in the interpretation of our empirical 
results. More subtle and interesting issues arise when it comes to the results about  ε σ  and  s σ . 
Remember that  ε σ  is the (inverse) precision of the family in assessing the kid’s talents and 
perspectives in the skilled labour market, whereas  s σ  is the (inverse) precision parents attach on the 






s =  as a measure for the relative weight parents assign to the first period signal at school, 
given the option to recover a second signal at school relative to the prior. It is a measure of the cultural 
confidence parents have in making their decision based on the public assessment at school relative to 
their private assessment. We obtain 
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Therefore the derivative above is signed according to the sign of  s s w T w θ − + 0 , i.e. the effect of the 
relative precision of the signals depends on parameter values. To interpret the result above notice that 
s s w T w θ < + 0  implies that from the point of view of the family it is ex-ante efficient 
12to send the child 
to school (remember that θ  is an unbiased estimate of α ). As a consequence the model predicts that, 
ceteris paribus (i.e. with given perceived skill premiums and opportunity costs of education), families 
with larger cultural capacity (larger ρ ) will be less selective with respect to kids for whom education is 
ex ante efficient (assessment based on θ ). In other words dropping-out from school is less likely to 
occur in more educated families, conditional on the kid’s talent being ex-ante assessed valuable for a 
skilled occupation
13.  Also notice that for given θ  and perceived skill premium, the larger the costs of 
education, the more selective is the family.
14  
                                                 
12 With risk neutrality sending the child to school is ex-ante efficient when, conditioning on the prior information θ , the 
expected return of education is above its opportunity costs (equal to the sum of direct education costs and foregone returns 
in the alternative occupation). 
13 One implication of the model is that less precise school signals (larger  s σ ) make families less strict and dilutes the 
average ability level of kids continuing in education. 
14 It is important to note that in a more imperfect (less intergenerationally mobile) world than the one considered in this 
model, children in educated families would have better perspectives in the skilled sector, ex ante and independently of their 
school attainment, due for example to inheritance of (skilled) jobs. In terms of our model we can capture this effect by 
  20Therefore both the quality of the public signal (lower quality of the grading process at school z) and 
the private one (quality of the parental assessment θ ) affect drop-out rates. Summarizing, the 
implication of the model for our empirical specification of the probability of dropping out of school is 
that both the impact of school quality and the impact of parental cultural capacity has a non linear 
effect on drop-out rates, interestingly the model captures different channels through which the family 
cultural capacity and the family’s economic capacity influence the education investment decision. This 
feature allows us to introduce parental education and measures of families permanent income as 
separate determinants of the investment choice.  
 
The decision to re-enter after a period out of school was characterized by the threshold in eq. (23). 
Straightforward algebra shows that 
































In words, re-entry is less likely when the family expects the child to face better opportunities in the 
unskilled labour market (larger  ) and/or larger costs of education (larger  ). A larger prior about 
the child’s opportunities on the skilled market (
0 w s T
θ ) and a better grade   in the first period at school 
increase the probability of re-entry. Moreover, children from richer families are more likely to re-enter 
conditional on drop-out. 
1 z
This conclusion is reinforced when we consider the comparative statics with respect to the precision 





 rewrite equation (23) using the definition of  1
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noticing that in more educated families, children would start their school career with a larger θ : the effect of cultural 
capacity would reinforce the standard economic argument based on wealth constraint: the sign of equation (25) is more 
likely to be negative in more educated families, i.e. given   children in more educated families would be less likely to drop 
out. 
1 z
  21Remember that from equation (10), H measures the relative weight placed on the signal received 
about opportunities on the unskilled labour market relative to the weight placed on the prior by each 
family. To derive empirical predictions from this latter comparative statics result consider that in the 
case of opportunities in the unskilled market, the weight put on the prior (relative to a signal) is likely 
to be larger for a parent working in the unskilled sector: there is less to learn about the unskilled 
opportunities facing his child for an unskilled worker than for a skilled one. We can conclude that, 
conditional on school abandonment, the probability of re-entry is larger for skilled families than for 
unskilled ones. In a specific sense the link between parental status and children’s educational choice 
exhibits persistence driven not only by wealth constraints and financial market imperfections (larger 
costs of education in less well to do families) but also by the cultural and social ability of different 
families to process signals about their children’s abilities in two alternative occupations
15.  
Summarizing, in this section we have laid out a simple model of parental decision making about 
educational choices when the process involves learning about the child’s abilities and job opportunities 
in two alternative occupations (skilled and unskilled). The model shows that cultural capacity and 
economic status of the family affect the probability of being a drop out, along with traditional 
determinants such as the skill premium as perceived by the decision maker. In adherence with the aim 
of the empirical analysis the model also shows that conditional on being a drop out the probability of 
returning back to school is affected by the same variables in an intuitive way. With this theoretical 




                                                 
15 As already noticed this does not mean that persistence is rooted on efficiency grounds in our model. Of course, along with 
financial market imperfections, cultural bias and other forms of intergenerational persistence of job allocation may have 
important social costs when we consider the problem of allocating talent to jobs. We do not address this point here. 
  224. Empirical Analysis: data and descriptive statistics 
 
On the basis of the theoretical model and general considerations offered on the likely causes of 
dropping out behaviour offered above, in this section we report the results of estimating an empirical 
model of  school-leaving and permanent dropping out behaviour amongst young people from Salerno 
and province. 
Data used in our analysis are drawn from a survey carried out in 2004 by CELPE (Centro 
Interdipartimentale di Economia del Lavoro e di Politica Economica, University of Salerno) on behalf 
of the Province of Salerno, and supplemented in 2005. The aim was to better understand the magnitude 
and determinants of the upper secondary school dropout phenomenon in the province of Salerno of 
those aged 15-18.  
Table 4 reports some information, provided by the local CSA (Centro per i Servizi Amministrativi di 
Salerno), on the distribution of enrollment in the high secondary public school in the Province during 
the schooling year 2003-2004.  
 





















Scientific 15000  23.2  5 135 
Vocational   13100  20.3  4  125 
Technical- commercial  11000  17.1  4  104 
Technical- industrial  8.000  12.4  3  60 
Classical 6000  9.3  2 56 
Psycho-pedagogical 6000  9.3  2  56 
Others (ITG,LL,IA)  5400  8.4  1  57 
Total 64500  100  21  593 
Source: Data provided by CSA of Salerno 
 
We constructed our sample on the basis of this distribution. As regards students regularly attending 
school, we employed a two stage procedure in which first we extracted 21 of the total of 85 schools in 
the province taking into account the distribution of schools across geographical areas and school type. 
Secondly around 600 students were randomly drawn from the 21 schools’ records.  
As regards the dropouts (and returnees) in our sample, a list of names of persons identified as 
“dropouts” by schools was provided by the local CSA and contained information on around 900 
  23individuals born between 1987 and 1989 inclusive. From these, 178 individuals were interviewed in 
June/July 2004 (126 “permanent” drop-outs and 52 “returnees”)
16. In early 2005, a refreshment sample 
of dropouts was added through renewed requests for dropout lists from all the schools and further 
attempts were made to contact the members of this enlarged group of dropouts (1326 as opposed to 
900) including also dropouts born in 1990. 
Thus, our empirical sampling base consisted of a sample of students along with the entire population 
of dropouts identified by the CSA. In other words, relatively speaking, dropouts (including returnees) 
are deliberately overrepresented in our sample. This was necessary in order ensure a group of dropouts 
sufficiently large to compare with students
17. Of this group of ‘officially identified’ dropouts a further 
one-fifth (or 274) ‘dropouts’ were excluded because at the time of the interview, there were discovered 
to not have interrupted their education (i.e. they were misclassified). Once those who were addresses 
were incorrect and so on were excluded , a group of 380 dropouts were identified, amongst whom 51 
(or 13.4%) refused to be interviewed. 
To summarize, the final full sample consists of 918 individuals, 593 of which are students, 206 were 
permanent dropouts and 123 returnees. Returnees are defined as those who at the time of the interview, 
were actually attending full time educational institutions, having spent some time out of school. Given 
that it is likely that ‘returnees’ were more likely to be interviewed – for fairly obvious reasons it is 
natural that they would have been more likely than dropouts to be contacted at the sampling stage – the 
substantial numbers of returnees in our sample (around one-third of all ‘dropouts’) is likely to be an 
overestimate of the numbers of returnees in the dropout population. There is no reliable way of 
verifying this, however, for our purposes, the main concerns are: 
a)  that those identified as dropouts had actually interrupted their education; and, 
b)  those identified as returnees had actually interrupted and then returned to education – as opposed 
simply to have transferred form one school to another.   
The procedures adopted leave us confident that this was largely achieved. To further ensure that this 
was the case, a further barrier for inclusion in the empirical analysis was adopted. In Italy, if one fails 
a scholastic year twice, one must in any event change educational institution (D.L 297/94)
18. Thus, 
young people in the sample who reported having repeated a specific school year twice were excluded 
from the sample. Individuals were also excluded from the sample if they never entered upper 
                                                 
16 The questionnaires for students and dropouts can be found at www.unisa.it/CELPE
17 On the basis of the data provided to us by the CSA and table 2 above, “dropouts” thus comprised around 2.7% of the 
registered school student population in Salerno Province  
18 The law includes some exceptions and modifications of this basic rule, however, effectively this rule is 
  24secondary education. In addition to the exclusion of individuals who had missing information on 
specific explanatory variables this lead to an empirical sample of 839 observations on 589 students, 
151 dropouts and 99 returnees. Descriptive statistics on the final sample are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for variable used in the analysis, by final status. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ownhome 0.812 0.391 0.713 0.454 0.797 0.403
no. Of family members (nat. log.) 1.466 0.231 1.460 0.232 1.530 0.267
no. Of durable goods in HH 2.713 0.229 2.707 0.219 2.500 0.330
father working 0.919 0.274 0.870 0.337 0.776 0.418
mother working 0.407 0.492 0.463 0.501 0.343 0.476
both parents working 0.379 0.485 0.380 0.488 0.238 0.427
Both parents living at home 0.917 0.276 0.889 0.316 0.853 0.355
Mother with incomplete secondary or vocational qualification 0.440 0.497 0.463 0.501 0.476 0.501
Mother acadmeic secondary or tertiary education 0.452 0.498 0.306 0.463 0.154 0.362
Male 0.560 0.497 0.602 0.492 0.594 0.493
Firstborn 0.418 0.494 0.324 0.470 0.315 0.466
Parents read to child 0.105 0.307 0.056 0.230 0.021 0.144
Parents helped with homework  0.244 0.430 0.176 0.383 0.140 0.348
Obese 0.083 0.276 0.093 0.291 0.245 0.431
health problems 0.027 0.163 0.019 0.135 0.056 0.231
Private lessons 0.385 0.487 0.315 0.467 0.210 0.409
Parents attended school meeting 0.603 0.490 0.537 0.501 0.483 0.501
Child interviewed at school 0.331 0.471 0.370 0.485 0.231 0.423
work experience at school 0.056 0.230 0.046 0.211 0.021 0.144
Failed a year during middle school 0.015 0.123 0.019 0.135 0.105 0.307
Failed a year during secondary school 0.088 0.284 0.426 0.497 0.462 0.500
mother sec/tertiary education interacted with failing a year 0.024 0.152 0.139 0.347 0.070 0.256
suspended during school 0.022 0.147 0.028 0.165 0.084 0.278
regular truant 0.051 0.220 0.102 0.304 0.371 0.485
Liceo 0.323 0.468 0.111 0.316 0.021 0.144
Population density 7.099 6.526 5.172 5.078 6.349 6.015
Unemployment rate 11.970 2.014 11.325 2.034 11.447 1.456












  255. Empirical Analysis: Model and Results 
 
The theoretical framework outlined above leads fairly naturally to the implementation of a two 
equation probit model. It also raises some quite interesting identification issues. In this section these 
issues will be discussed and the results of the empirical implementation presented. The discussion 
above thus provides a framework within which to look at the factors influencing school dropout and 
subsequent return behaviour. It also provides some testable predictions which are discussed below. 
However, it is evident that the framework outlined above is very simple and is unlikely to capture, as it 
stands, all the factors influencing dropout behaviour. Moreover, the link between the framework and its 
empirical implementation requires further assumptions on the link between observed variables and their 
unobserved counterparts in the framework. The extent to which the framework captures essential 
elements of the empirical results is the focus of the discussion of the results. This allows us to suggest 
missing elements which would be needed to move towards a more complete model of dropout 
behaviour. 
In any event, on the basis of the simple framework outlined above, a parent will decide to take its 
child out of school at time t1 iff: 
 


































Where L* may be thought of the (unobserved) tendency to initially leave school. Similarly, 
rearranging (22), the child will permanently drop out at time t2 iff: 
 
















































Where D* represents the (unobserved) tendency to permanently drop out. 
The empirical counterparts of the conditions for school leaving and permanent dropout are, assuming  
standard normally distributed error terms: 
 
(28’)   1 1 1 * e X L + = β     e 1 ~ N(0,1) 
and  
(29’)   2 2 2 * e X D + = β      e 2 ~ N(0,1)   
  26 
Of course we only observe whether or not the person permanently drops out and/or leaves school 
initially, so we need the additional relations: 
 
(30)    L = 1   iff  L*>0 
and 
(31)  D = 1 iff D*>0 
 
Furthermore, D (=0,1) is only observed if L*>0. 
Very clearly the factors influencing L and D are very similar. The only difference between (28) and 
(29) lies in the additional terms involving H(φ-w0). This has several implications: 
i)  in practice, the error terms, e1 and e2 are likely to be correlated which implies the 
estimation of a censored bivariate probit model; 
ii)  The only way a person can return to school at t2, having left at t1 is if φ<w0 – the signal 
from the labour market is worse than the parent’s a priori expectation; 
iii)  a censored bivariate probit model of this form requires at least one exclusion restriction 
in order to identify β1,  β2 and the correlation between the error terms, ρ12, either 
through functional form or, more usually, by excluding at least one variable from (28’) 
included in (29’). Since (29’) is simply (28’) with some additional terms, it is not at all 
obvious how one would exclude variables from (28’) included in (29’) thus creating an 
issue of identification. 
 
We reports results using alternative approaches to identification. In order to illustrate the restrictions 
imposed, it helps to rewrite the model slightly: 
 
(28’’)   1 1 1 * e Z X L + + = α β         
(29’’)   2 2 1 2 ) ( * e Z X D + + + = α α β       










    e2)   Cov(e1,
ρ
Note that X and Z are the same in both equations. Notionally, the distinction between X and Z is that 
the variables in X only have an impact on D* through their impact on L*, whereas the Z variables may 
  27affect D* both through their impact on L*, but also in their impact on  H(φ-w0). Clearly as it stands the 
model is not identified, nor is it consistent with the underlying theoretical framework.  
The results reported here involve in turn the following identifying restrictions: 
(i) ρ12 = 0   i.e. two univariate probit equations.  
(ii) β1 =  β2    i.e. The X variables have the same impact on the tendency to leave school as they do on 
the tendency to permanently drop out.  
(iii) α1 + α2 = 0   for some elements of Ζ. i.e. For at least some of the variables affecting both L* and  
H(φ-w0), the overall effect cancels out. 
Our preferred approach is the adoption of restriction (ii)
19. It is closest in spirit to the theoretical 
framework although it does involve the exploitation of the non-linearity of the model to obtain 
identification. Restrictions of the type (iii) are more conventional in empirical work, however, in the 
current context, actually appear more arbitrary than (ii). 
   Finally, in order to arrive at the equations actually estimated, one needs to posit a relation between 
the ‘explanatory’ variables in (28) and (29) and their empirical counterparts, X and Z. We make no 
attempt to formally estimate the parameters of (28) and (29), rather we identify factors likely to 
influence elements of the underlying theoretical model. Above-all it is important to identify variables 
likely to affect H(φ-w0).  
Specifically, the variables included are:  
-  living in family owned accommodation, the number of components of the family
20 and the 
number of durable goods
21 in the household are included to represent permanent income. These 
variables are posited to enter only through their influence on the school leaving decision – 
specifically through their impact on financial constraints of further education facing the family 
– here represented by Ts - and/or, à la Heckman, through their impact on cognitive ability, on 
z1; 
-  The mother’s level of education, a fairly crucial variable in as much as it is expected to affect 
both K and H
22 ; 
                                                 
19 Derivation of the formal identification of the model in this instance goes beyond the scope of this paper, however, that the 
model is identified is fairly obvious if one thinks  in terms of the likelihood function to estimate. See Maddala (1983) and 
particularly Cameron & Trivedi (2005) for discussions of the issues involved. 
20 Obviously inversely related to family permanent income. 
21 Individuals were asked whether they had access to a variety of durable goods (e.g. TV, computer, car and so on). These 
were simply summed to provide an indicator of family wealth. 
22 Note however that this by no means necessarily implies correlation between K and H. 
  28-  whether one or other (or both) of the parents are working, intended to reflect both family 
income (affecting the decision at t1), and, conceivably also H; 
-  Whether both parents are living at home, the amount of attention and help given by parents to 
their children during the early scholastic period and whether the child is firstborn, all of which 
have been identified in the literature as factors influencing scholastic performance, presumably 
through the impact on cognitive ability and so on z1;      
-  Obesity and the possession of permanent health problems are both likely to affect scholastic 
performance, z1; 
-  Experiences at school – whether the child and/or parents attended regular meeting with teachers 
at school, whether the child undertook work experience at school, whether the child had private 
lessons outside school; 
-  Whether the child failed a year – clearly related to z1 but also feasibly reflecting a series of 
underlying factors returned to below – and whether the child was suspended from school and 
whether they frequently played truant; 
-  The type of school, although not formally part of the theoretical framework, is also, given its 
obvious importance is also included, although in a limited way i.e. whether the child attended a 
Liceo, the more academic stream; 
-  Finally, three variables are included to reflect local conditions – population density, the local 
unemployment rate and the size of the local labour market are all included and likely to affect 
the direct and opportunity costs of education as well as influence the labour market experiences 
of  school leavers
23. 
The results are presented in table 6. One might observe that the estimation has quite a lot of 
explanatory power. In particular, the two pseudo-r
2 statistics in the uncorrelated probits, each of .32, are 
rather high for this type of estimation. One might also note that both bivariate probits reject restriction 
(i) of no correlation  between the equations.  In order to arrive at the equality restrictions (restriction 
(ii)),  a priori expectation regarding variables which were thought not to affect  elements of H(φ-w0), in 
one case modified by observation of the independent probit equations, were used to arrive at the 
reported form. Although a Likelihood ratio test of the restrictions as a whole is not possible since the 
unrestricted model is not identified, LR tests of the single restrictions are never rejected at a .05 
significance level. The model estimated with exclusion restrictions produces rather similar results to the 
                                                 
23 These data are defined according to the national statistical agency’s (ISTAT) definition of local labour markets. On this 
criteria, Salerno province is divided into 20 local labour markets. Data for four other bordering local labour markets were 
also included due to some students not actually living in Salerno Province itself.    
  29bivariate probit model with equality restrictions. The restrictions themselves were largely determined 
by empirical observation as opposed to a priori consideration. Variables were excluded which, on the 
basis of the uncorrelated probit model  appeared to have little or no impact on the decision to drop out 
permanently. 
The first group of explanatory variables in the table relate to family permanent income. Curious 
amongst these is home ownership which very clearly has a different effect on permanent dropping out 
than it does on initial school-leaving
24. One possible (albeit not very convincing) interpretation might 
take the form of some sort of ‘Oswald’ home ownership effect on the likelihood of finding 
employment. Otherwise, the permanent income variable perform as expected although they are not 
always statistically significant, they always have the expected sign. The positive coefficient on the 
‘mother working’ dummy also invites comment. Note that this is measuring the effect of only the 
mother working since ‘both parents working’ is also included as a variable.  
Of particular significance in terms of the theoretical framework, maternal education is also, net of the 
effect of family permanent income as measured here, important in explaining behaviour. Specifically, 
higher levels of mothers’ education is negatively (and statistically significantly) associated with school 
leaving over and above the measures of family income, as predicted by the theoretical framework. Two 
possibly connected reasons can be offered for the inclusion of mother’s, rather than father’s, education. 
First, mother’s education is more clearly associated with school-leaving
25 than is father’s education, 
and, second, mother’s education is likely to be less closely related to family permanent income. As 
noted above we interpret this in terms of the effects of family culture operating through the relative 
precision of the initial school signal. The effect seems to disappear  with regard to dropping out (in the 
correlated probits)  which is also reasonable within the framework outlined above.   
As regards individual characteristics, it is curious that being male has a negative coefficient albeit not 
statistically significant, since a much higher proportion of young males leave school than young 
females. This implies that they tend to have more of characteristics associated with school leaving (and 
                                                 
24 I both bivariate models the difference in coefficients is statistically significant at p<0.01. 
25 See the single (full) probit estimations reported in the appendix. 
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Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Ownhome -0.10 0.135 0.58 0.234 -0.08 0.133 0.52 0.207 -0.07 0.134 0.51 0.193
no. Of family members (nat. log.) 0.17 0.246 0.88 0.479 0.34 0.192 0.34 0.192 0.17 0.241 0.68 0.353
no. Of durable goods in HH -0.50 0.223 -1.34 0.408 -0.67 0.174 -0.67 0.174 -0.47 0.220 -0.90 0.366
father working -0.12 0.227 -0.25 0.379 -0.12 0.224 -0.16 0.335 -0.16 0.213 - -
mother working 0.94 0.317 0.33 0.545 0.94 0.314 0.02 0.464 0.85 0.308 - -
both parents working -0.81 0.337 -0.64 0.590 -0.80 0.334 -0.37 0.508 -0.79 0.323 - -
Both parents living at home 0.09 0.211 0.12 0.370 0.10 0.160 0.10 0.160 0.13 0.198 - -
Mother with incomplete secondary or vocational qualificat -0.51 0.145 -0.50 0.243 -0.51 0.144 -0.27 0.220 -0.49 0.144 -0.19 0.217
Mother acadmeic secondary or tertiary education -0.62 0.180 -0.56 0.386 -0.61 0.178 -0.28 0.384 -0.60 0.179 -0.14 0.346
Male -0.18 0.117 -0.17 0.221 -0.14 0.092 -0.14 0.092 -0.16 0.117 -0.05 0.175
Firstborn -0.17 0.115 -0.09 0.215 -0.12 0.090 -0.12 0.090 -0.17 0.115 0.05 0.173
Parents read to child -0.38 0.224 0.11 0.626 -0.28 0.192 -0.28 0.192 -0.41 0.224 0.31 0.476
Parents helped with homework  -0.16 0.142 0.15 0.286 -0.03 0.117 -0.03 0.117 -0.13 0.142 0.30 0.231
Obese 0.46 0.166 0.94 0.306 0.53 0.131 0.53 0.131 0.46 0.165 0.59 0.276
health problems 0.62 0.311 0.85 0.607 0.57 0.252 0.57 0.252 0.59 0.310 0.39 0.525
Private lessons -0.26 0.128 -0.14 0.244 -0.19 0.101 -0.19 0.101 -0.26 0.128 -0.04 0.197
Parents attended school meeting -0.03 0.113 -0.03 0.207 -0.03 0.087 -0.03 0.087 -0.02 0.113 -0.02 0.167
Child interviewed at school -0.09 0.121 -0.35 0.228 -0.13 0.095 -0.13 0.095 -0.07 0.120 -0.14 0.186
work experience at school -0.23 0.285 -0.63 0.588 -0.30 0.227 -0.30 0.227 -0.25 0.285 -0.55 0.455
Failed a year during middle school 0.47 0.298 0.48 0.505 0.46 0.297 0.31 0.470 0.49 0.297 0.16 0.448
Failed a year during secondary school 0.96 0.152 0.12 0.241 0.97 0.150 -0.21 0.251 0.96 0.151 -0.34 0.223
mother sec/tertiary education interacted with failing a year 0.68 0.290 -0.01 0.472 0.65 0.286 -0.26 0.442 0.69 0.289 -0.48 0.396
suspended during school 0.31 0.282 0.86 0.576 0.38 0.224 0.38 0.224 0.30 0.280 0.57 0.468
regular truant 0.74 0.170 1.05 0.264 0.75 0.137 0.75 0.137 0.75 0.168 0.51 0.256
Liceo -0.80 0.171 -0.95 0.494 -0.74 0.156 -0.74 0.156 -0.82 0.164 - -
Population density -0.02 0.011 0.04 0.022 -0.02 0.011 0.04 0.019 -0.02 0.011 0.04 0.016
Unemployment rate -0.13 0.038 -0.05 0.075 -0.12 0.038 0.00 0.066 -0.12 0.037 - -
large local labour market 0.49 0.160 0.02 0.271 0.47 0.159 -0.10 0.245 0.48 0.156 -0.16 0.195
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 dropout) than do their female counterparts. In line with findings in the literature, being the first born 
is negatively correlated with  leaving school. Youthful obesity is clearly positively correlated with 
school leaving
26. Parental attention to children is negatively associated with school leaving although 
this is not statistically significant, as is the variable indicating whether the person had private lessons 
while at school – this may be explained by the likely duality in the motivation. On the one hand, 
children are more likely to have private lessons if their parents care more about their performance at 
school. On the other, private lessons are also likely to be associated with poor performance at school. 
Turning to experiences at school, it will be observed that failing a year, at secondary level
27, is an 
important determinant of initial school leaving. Obviously this is directly related to the school signal, 
z1. The coefficient is positive and strongly statistically significant. The effect on permanent drop out is 
rather different however. In this case the coefficient is close to zero and, for secondary failure, is 
actually negative. Although the coefficient is not statistically different from zero, the difference in the 
effect of  failure at secondary level on initial school-leaving and permanent dropping out very clearly 
is
28. The implication is that the kind of person who is likely to fail at school may also tend to have other 
characteristics which cause him or her to fail, and/or have expectations which are unreasonable and/or 
inaccurate concerning, the unskilled labour market. Moving beyond the theoretical framework, an 
alternative plausible explanation is that failure at school is an indicator of mismatch between schools 
and students.  The inclusion of an interaction term between high maternal education and failure at 
school is also positive and statistically significant. Again, this takes us beyond the simple model 
outlined above and points towards a slightly more complex relationship between parental education and 
the school leaving signal than is suggested by the underlying model. A plausible story here would be 
that better educated parents are more likely to interpret the school signal as an issue of mismatch 
between school (or teacher) and pupil (their child). If better educated parents are more likely to 
interpret their child being failed at school as a problem with the teacher or the school, that is if z1 is 
interpreted as an indicator of school quality rather than the students’ intrinsic potential, they are more 
likely to react to a poor school signal by removing the child from the school and seeking an alternative. 
This also fits with the non significant interaction coefficient in the permanent drop out equation. 
                                                 
26 The objection might be raised here concerning possibly endogeneity of obesity. Young people leaving school may 
become depressed etc..  and so obese. We would argue that this is unlikely to be the case – one does not become obese 
overnight and  secondly tests of the issue in a companion paper suggest this not to be the case. 
27 It will be recalled that those reporting their last school as a middle school were excluded form the analysis, which means 
that those dropping out before arriving at secondary school are excluded, with the obvious consequences on the effect of 
middle school failure compared to secondary failure.  
28 Statistically significant at p < .01. Implying ceteris paribus, a stronger negative reaction to bad labour market signals. There are various 
ways that this type of phenomenon might be captured in a more sophisticated theoretical model. 
However, in this paper we limit ourselves to identifying the issue.     
Discontinuous attendance is also important in determining initial school leaving. This may indicate in 
part relatively low ability and/or low utility value of school (a big Ts). The effect of truancy on school 
leaving and permanent dropout are very similar (and indeed in the second model, the coefficient is 
constrained to be equal across equations). Suggesting that the effect is only operating through its effect 
on performance and the consumption value (cost) of education. The estimation also includes a variable 
representing attendance at a more academically oriented school. Again, in order to properly account for 
this type of effect one would need a more articulated model, specifically with more than one type of 
school. 
 The final group of variables reflect local conditions. Based on indicators for local labour markets, 
these are intended to capture geographical variations in factors affecting school attendance. The local 
unemployment rate is interpreted as an (inverse) indicator of the opportunity cost of education. Indeed 
the coefficient in the school-leaving equation is always negative and statistically significant. In the 
dropout equation the effect disappears suggesting a counterbalancing impact of the unemployment rate 
through its effect on the reaction to local labour market experiences. A not unreasonable possibility, 
remaining within the framework, is that the unemployment rate is positively related to H. The higher 
the unemployment rate the more likely that unexpectedly poor labour market experiences are likely to 
be interpreted as reflecting real possibilities rather than just bad luck. This is stretching the framework 
somewhat, and is certainly not the only possible explanation, however, it does suggests that the finding 
in itself does not invalidate the framework. A larger local labour market has a positive impact on school 
leaving which again disappears when permanent dropout behaviour is estimated. Here again one would 
expect ceteris paribus that the larger the local labour market the greater the opportunities for the 
unskilled and so the higher the opportunity cost of education. The disappearance of the effect in the 
permanent dropout equation might once again be interpreted in terms of its effect on H, however as 
before one would not want to push this argument too far. The population density which has a negative 
impact on school leaving and a positive impact on permanently dropping out is probably more 
plausibly explained by a mismatch argument than by the framework outlined here. Specifically, a 
higher population density is likely to be associated with a wider variety (and number) of schools 
nearby. A greater variety of schools is likely to increase the probability of a ‘good’ initial match 
between school and student, thereby reducing the likelihood of initial school-leaving. At the same time, 
  33it will reduce the cost (or increase the benefits) of returning to education in the event that one does 
leave. This does go very much beyond the simple model outlined above.        
Thus, the results presented here suggest that the theoretical framework goes some way to providing a 
plausible model of school-leaving and return. In particular, it provides an explanation for the   
importance of parental education in encouraging educational participation which is independent of 
income and which is verified in the results reported above. However, the framework does not account 
for all observed features of dropping out considered here. The most notable gap in the model relates to 
issues of educational mismatch. The empirical results strongly suggest that there is a role for 
educational mismatch of one type or another which cannot be accounted for by the theoretical 
framework, given the existence of only one type of school. This would suggest that the incorporation of 





  345. Conclusions      
   
Dropping out of school is at the centre of current debates in the EU concerning long growth and 
competitiveness. In line with the Lisbon Strategy, in the last decade the Italian authorities have built up 
a complex institutional networking system aimed at reducing school drop out and increasing the 
duration of educational participation.   
This paper proposes a simple theoretical framework and an empirical analysis aimed at throwing 
greater light on this phenomena in Southern Italy. In the theoretical model and its empirical 
implementation, a two-stage decision process is hypothesised in line with observed behaviour which 
shows that many young people ‘dropout’ of school only to return subsequently. Such behaviour is not 
compatible with a standard full information human capital model.  
The results confirm the role of both economic and cultural capacity of the family of origin in 
separately shaping observed choices about drop-out and return to school by individuals in our sample. 
Interestingly we find that whilst poor performance at, and low attachment to, school – measured by 
repetition of the school year through end of year failure and attendance records - is a key determinant 
of initial dropping out, the former does not seem to affect subsequent return to education.  
The results reported here also provide substantial evidence of mismatch between school and student 
as determining behaviour. The answer then to the question in the title of this paper, interpreted in its 
normative sense, is no: the process of allocation of talents to school tracks is subject to many trial 
errors and revisions by families and many of those who leave school return to it. The point is whether 
this process of allocation of talents to school tracks is efficient and whether we should see review of 
family decisions as the natural outcome of the learning process. Specifically is return to school an 
indicator of allocative inefficiency? It is argued there that much depends on the determinants of school 
re-entry behaviour. We do not address normative aspects in the model (indeed every family equilibrium 
decision is individually rational, conditional on the information set they act upon so that the allocation 
of the child to the school track is interim Pareto-efficient) and can only base our judgment on the 
suggestive empirical evidence. This latter however allows us to shape a judgment on this issue: a policy 
maker should not necessarily be happy after observing a large fraction of students return to school after 
a period out. Since cultural and economic capacity matter a lot for the actual review of the decision, the 
comparison of students’ irregular careers among different education systems (across regions or across 
countries) should be used as an indication of the social cost of the mistakes associated to irregular 
careers. Moreover since there is evidence of a role for the mismatch between a child and the school in 
  35influencing the decision, indicators of irregular careers should be adopted by decision-makers to assess 
the quality of education provision by public agencies and to allocate public resources in this area. 
Clearly further work is needed on this point to assess public school intervention in education and to a 
more effective policy design.  
Our findings, suggest that students’ decisions as whether to leave education definitively or to return 
back after a period in the ‘real world’ are also due to an information gathering process by parents about 
children’s attitudes, expected wages in the unskilled market and school quality. In other words, to 
maximize the investment on education parents need to evaluate their options, in terms of the child’s 
educational choices, on the basis of economic criteria. However, given that information is imperfect 
and costly to improve, mistakes are made and additional information collected may cause parents to 
revise their previous decisions. Consequently, one policy implication of our analysis is that efforts 
should be made to reduce these information costs. To help children make their best educational choice, 
educational guidance and counselling services from primary school onward should be implemented. 
Programmes of career guidance –career orientation, academic and occupational orientation with high 
and post-secondary schooling, work-based learning and skills development- should enhance the 
capacity to evaluate work opportunities. In association with the reorganization of the vocational 
education and training system, this is likely to reduce the gap between formal education and training 
and the world of work. Ensuring school quality calls for a broader education system reform 










Acemoglu D. and J. Angrist (2001), “How Large Are Human Capital Externalities? Evidence from 
Compulsory Schooling Laws,” NBER Macroannual, pp. 9-59. 
 
Akerlof G. and R. Kranton (2002), “Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of 
Education” Journal of Economic Literature, No. 40, Vol. 4 (December), pp. 1167-1201. 
 
Angrist J. D. and A. Krueger (1991), “Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect Schooling and 
Earnings?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 979, 1014. 
 
Becker G. S. (1964), Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference 
to Education. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Blundell R., B. Sianesi and L. Dearden (2003), “Evaluating the impact of education on earnings in 
the UK: Models, methods and results from the NCDS”, IFS Working Paper W03/20, London. 
 
Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Card D. (2001), “Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econometric 
Problems,” Econometrica, vol. 69(5), pp. 1127-60. 
 
Cardoso A. R. and D. Verner (2006), “School drop-out and push-out factors in Brazil : the role of 
early parenthood, child labour, and poverty”, IZA DP No. 2515, December. 
 
Carneiro P. and J. J. Heckman (2002), “The Evidence on Credit Constraints in Post-Secondary 
Schooling,” NBER Working Paper 90955, July. 
 
Carneiro P and J. J. Heckman (2005), “The Evidence on Credit Constraints in Post-Secondary 
Schooling”, Economic Journal, 112, pp. 705-734. 
 
CELPE (2006), L’analisi del fenomeno dei dropout nella provincia di Salerno, Celpe, Salerno 
 
Checchi D. and L. Flabbi (2006), "Intergenerational mobility and schooling decisions in Italy and 
Germany", mimeo.  
 
Checchi D. and F. Zollino (2001), “Sistema scolastico e selezione sociale in Italia”, Rivista di 
Politica Economica, n. 7/8, pp43-84;  
 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2002),  “European benchmarks in 
education and training: follow-up to the Lisbon European Council” COM(2002) 629 final, Brussels. 
 
Eckstein Z. and K.I. Wolpin (1999), “Why Youths Drop Out of High School: the Impact of 
Preferences, Opportunities, and Abilities”, Econometrica, vol. 67, n. 6, November, pp. 1295-1339. 
  37 
Hanushek E. A., V. Lavy and V. L. K. Hitomi (2006), “Do students care about school quality? 
determinants of dropout behaviour in developing countries”, NBER Working Paper 12737. 
 
Heckman J. J. and P. Carneiro (2003), “Human Capital Policy”, NBER working paper 9495. 
 
Istat (2001), 14° Censimento Generale della Popolazione e delle Abitazioni, data on line at 
www.istat.it. 
 
Istat (2003-2005), Popolazione residente nella Provincia di Salerno per età e sesso, anni 2003-2005, 
data on line at demo.istat.it. 
 
Lee V.E  and D. T. Burkam (2003), “Dropping Out of High School: The Role of School Organization 
and Structure”, American Educational Research Journal, Summer, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 353–393. 
 
Lochner L. and E. Moretti (2004), “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison 
Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94(1), pp. 155-89. 
 
Maddala G.S. (1983), Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione (2006a), La dispersione scolastica, Direzione Generale Studi e 
Programmazione, Ufficio di Statistica, Rome. 
 
Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione (2006b), La scuola in cifre, Direzione Generale Studi e 
Programmazione, Rome. 
 
Mookherjee D. and D. Ray (2003), “Persistent Inequality”, Review of Economic Studies 2003, 70, 
(2), pp. 369-393. 
 
OECD (2000), From initial education to working life: make transitions work, Paris. 
 
Oreopoulos P. (2007), “Do Dropouts Drop Out Too Soon? Wealth, Health, and Happiness from 
Compulsory Schooling,” Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Quintini G. and S. Martin (2006), “Starting Well or Losing their Way? The Position of Youth in the 
Labour Market in OECD Countries”, OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers, n. 39, 
Paris. 
 
Rumberger R. W. and S. L. Thomas (2000), “The distribution of dropout and turnover rates among 
urban and suburban high schools”, Sociology of Education, 73(1), 39–67. 
 
Sargent T.J., (1987), Macroeconomic Theory, New York: Academic Press. 
 
  38Appendix 1 
 
Here we show that after the first period of schooling, i.e. conditioning on   alone and given that 
parents rationally anticipate 
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The expected benefits from dropping out is given by  
 
{} {}
{} {} 0 2 0 2 1 2 2 2
future   in the entry  - re   no given 
out    dropping   from   benefits   expected
1 2
future   in the entry  - re given   
out   dropping   from   benefits   expected
1 2 1 2 2 2 2
)]
~
( 1 [ ) ~ ( ] ˆ ˆ [   E   )] ~ ( 1 [   )
~
(      
] [   E )]
~
( 1 [ ] [   E ) ~ ( ] ˆ ˆ [   E   )] ~ ( 1 [   )
~
(
w F w z F T w z F F





φ α α φ
φ α α φ
− + + − − =
− + + − − =
4 4 43 4 4 42 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1
 
 
Simple algebra shows that the equilibrium choice satisfies 
 











z K K K K
+
≥ − + − −
0
1 2 1 2 1 ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 1 [ θ  
equivalently 
(.) ~
1 1 z z ≥  
Characterizes equilibrium parental choice conditional on  .  1 z
 
 
  39